Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Meredith Page v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co. :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Dahl & Sagers; Attorneys for Appellant and Cross Respondent;
Lawrence L. Summerhays; Attorney for Respondent and Cross Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Page v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co., No. 9902 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4266

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.UNIVERSITY OF=

-

t I

~

IN THE SUPREME CO.uAT.;J.:~.
of the . .~! ~
U

i_

STAlE OF

t

t.fr~l!l; 1 ~ 1963

MEREDITN~t~~Appellant :lnd " ,cs~p;;,;;o c~~;:;;-ui~h
Respondent on Cross Appeal,
vs.
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant, Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

Case No. 99~

RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent and
Cross Appellant
DAHL & SAGERS
17 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah
Everett .E. Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for Appellant and
Cross Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE____
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF F A'CTS ----------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

11

POINT I. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD OR THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER OR NOT MR. PAGE VIOLATED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY WAS A PROPER
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND
JURY AND A PROPER MATTER OF DEFENSE.----------------------------------------------------------------------

11

POINT II. THE TRIA'L COURT DI'D NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ITS JUDGMENT IN REFUSING TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL. ------------------------------------------------------------ 31
CROSS APPEAL
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
PARTIAL NEW TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO
THE VALIDITY OF THE SE,COND POLICY
PURCHASED BY THE PAINTIFF FROM THE
DEFENDANT. ---------------------------------------------------------- 35
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Boise Association of Credit Men v. U.S. Fire Insurance
Co., 256 'Pac. 523 -------------------------------------------------------- 26
Firemans Fund. Ins. Co. v. McGreavy, 118 Fed (2) 115 18
Harland v. Liverpool and L. & G. Insurance Co., 192
:Jio. App. 198, 180 S.W. 998 -------------------------------------------Ha"-kins , .. Perry, 123 Ut. 16 253 P(2) 372 -------------------In Re S"·ans Estate, 4 Ut. (2) 277, 293 P (2) 682 ________

21
17
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Peterson v. Budge, 35 Ut. 596, 102 P. 216 -------------------Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 87 Ut. 364 49
p ( 2) 403 --------------------------------------------------------------------

17
16

TEXTS
61 ALR (2) 728, 729 Sub. Pa:r. C -------------------------------- 26
1'6 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, Section 9104__ 19, 21
Moores Federal Practice, Second Edition, Volume 6
Page 3671 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
Restatement of Law of Agency, Section 13 ________________ 14
Restatement of Law of Agency, Section 390 ________ 14, 16, 17
Restatement of Law of Agency, Section 387 ________________ 15
S'TATUTES
Rule 16 UROP --------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Rule 49 URGP -------------------------------------------------------------------Rule 59 URCP --------------------------------------------------------------------

31
32

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MEREDITH PAGE,
Plaintiff, Appellant and
Respondent on Cross Appeal,
vs.
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant, Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

Case No. 9903

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, an agent of the defendant insurance company, seeks to recover the actual cash value
of a war 'surplus building destroyed by fire in February, 1961, under two fire insurance policies issued
by the defendant company to the agent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWE·R COURT
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on
two special interrogatories. The jury found that
the actual cash value of the building was $10,000 and
also found that the plaintiff failed to make a full
and honest disclosure to the defendant fire insurance
company of the material facts regarding the nature
1
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and intended use of the burned fourplex. The trial
court thereupon entered judgment for the defendant
of no cause of action. It then granted plaintiff's
motion for a new trial and upon reconsidering
granted a partial new trial only on the issue of
the validity of the second insurance policy. From
this judgment the plaintiff has appealed and defendant has cross appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a
new trial. Defendant seeks reversal of the trial
court's order granting a partial new trial and asks
that the trial court's judgment of no cause of action
be reinstated. In the alternative that plaintiff have
a new trial only on the i'Ssue of whether the plaintiff
violated his fiduciary duty, when the policies of
insurance were written, by not disclosing to the
company the actual condition and use of said buildIng.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has not included many facts which
the defendant considers important in the fair presentation of its ease and will, therefore, set out its
own statement of facts.
The plaintiff Meredith Page had been a soliciting agent for Utah Home Fire Insurance Company
for over 30 years (R104) and worked through Heber
J. Grant and Company, a general agent for Utah
Home Fire Insurance Company. He also owns 22
2
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rental units in Salt Lake, Riverton and Draper
which he manages. (R105)
In December of 1958 Mr. Page purchased a war
surplus building used for Air Force officers quarters
located at the Salt Lake Air base, from LaVeil Webster, a professional house mover. The building had
22 rooms (R116) and approximately 4670 square
feet of floor space. (R108). On December 31, 1958
he went to Heber J. Grant and Company where he
met with Mr. Ove C. Inkley, secretary and treasurer
of Heber J. Grant and Company, who had known
Mr. Page for 25 years (R. 284) and discussed with
him the matter of taking out a fire insurance policy
on the building. There is a dispute in the evidence
with respect to what Mr. Page said he told Mr.
Inkley and what Mr. Inkley says Mr. Page told
him concerning the building. The jury found that
Mr. Page failed to make an honest disclosure of the
material facts pertaining to the nature and intended
use of the building and defendant will point out
the differences in testimony. Mr. Page stated that
he told Mr. Inkley he had purchased a building of
approximately 5,000 square feet and that he was
going to move it out in the county on U.S. 91 at
14610 South, immediately south of the Utah State
Prison, (R.113) and put it on property there as a
fourplex (R. 103); that he had paid approximately
$2,000 for it, to be exact $1,800 (R. 109). He said it
would be moved within two weeks to a month
(R. 135); that it would be cut up into three or five
3
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pieces when .moved (R. 140); that the wiring would
have to be cut and the pipes (R. 140); that it had a
90 weight tar paper roof; that many of the windows
had been broken (R. 142); that this was an Air Force
officers' living quarters and a few minor repairs
would put it in good condition (R. 143); that the
floors were good and tiled throughout (R. 144); that
the plumbing was all in and very little would have.·
to be done to the plumbing (R. 144); that it was
built for a central heating ~system and that he was
going to make individual heating systems for each
apartment; the pipe was already in, most of it, and
it would be very little work on that (R. 144 & 145); ·.
that he told Mr. Inkley there were closets in each
apartment (R. 145) and that the building was in
good condition (R. 146); he also told him the type of
floor joists on the building and explained pretty well
the construction and condition (R. 157).
Mr. Inkley on the other hand testified that Mr.
Page told him the building had a good roof, it had
a good floor and there was tile on the floor as well
as on the walls. The walls were hard walls, good
substantial walls. The building was substantial all
the way through (R. 285); he said it would be heated1
by gas, it was wired already, the plumbing was in'
it, he would just have to connect with the plumbing·
and the wiring; that after he repaired some little
damage he would have four nice rental units; that
he was putting it on a cement foundation (R. 286).
Mr. Inkley said Page did not mention they would
4
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c:ut up the building in units for moving (R286) and
that if he had told him he would not have forgotten
it (R. 297). Mr. Page did not tell him a large number
of windows were out of the building ( R. 286 & 297).
He said Mr. Page told him that there would be a
little wall repair near the baseboard where there
had been some wearing, nothing extensive, however,
(R. 286). Page also told him that the light fixtures,
plumbing fixtures and heating fixtures were in, the,
building had been occupied and he was purchasing
the building just as it stood when it was vacated
and that everything was in the building when he
bought it. (R. 287).
Mr. Inkley on cross examination by Mr. Dahl
stated as follows with respect to his conversation
with Mr. Page and the question of insurability of
the building:
"Well, when Mr. Page first mentioned it,
I was in somewhat of a doubt but as he went
on to explain what he had there, my doubts
left me, he apparently had a good property."
(R. 293 L30, 294 L 1 & 2)
When Mr. Inkley referred the matter to the underwriter he states he told the underwriter what Mr.
Page had told him and that he understood the building would be moved intact (R. 89). He further testified that if he had known the building wa'S to be cut
in pieces to move, that many of the window panes
·were missing, that some of the walls were in poor
repair, that some of the plumbing was missing; that
the heating unit was not in the building, the wiring
5
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was not complete and that the building would be
vacant for some time, he would have told Page that
it was doubtful the building could be insured and
that he would have passed the information along
and that it would be referred to their underwriter,
Mr..Everett, and probably also Mr. Neil Mann, the
underwriter for Utah Home Fire Insurance Company.
Mr. Mann testified that had the matter been
referred to him with the information that the building was being cut into pieces to be moved, that many.
of the windows were out, that the wiring would be~,
cut, roofing, plumbing and heating lines cut, that'
some of the walls were in poor condition with holes
in them and that the building was going to be moved:
20 miles, the policy would not have been written
"It would not have been written because
the rate used wouldn't reflect the hazards involved. The rate used was 97 cents per $1,000.
Insurance companies statistically compute
rates based on hazards, based on experience.
The experiece involved in buildings cut up,
vacant, unoccupied, with broken windows is
so muchworse than a completed building that
we could not. The rate we would quote would
be so high that the insured would not ask for
insurance. In other words, the rate of 97 cents
is based on a completed fourplex with no repairs needed; that we would quote." (R. 299
& 300).
Mr. Everett, the underwriter for Heber J. Grant
and Company, also testified that the risk would
6
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have been rejected if the information that the building was to be cut up, moved, many of the windo'v
panes missing, the walls damaged and the wiring
and plumbing cut, had been conveyed to him at the
time the application for insurance was made.
After some discussion as to the amount of insurance to be placed on the building plaintiff applied
for $20,000 with the statement that after he did
some more work on it he would take 1nore insurance
(R. 110). The policy was issued Dec. 31, 1958 showing the building located a:t 14610 South State Street
and signed by Meredith Page as agent (R. 3) (Exh.
1P).
The building was moved in about April of 1959
(R. 149 & 150) to a point just south of the State
Prison and within 12-15 feet of another fourplex
owned by Page. (R. 177)
After it was moved and set on a foundation
of cement and cinderblocks, with the blocks just
being laid one on top of the other without cement
(R148), the plaintiff had the window panes put in,
covered up the cuts on the roof "'~ith tin and had
a neighbor teen-age boy paint the outside (R. 173
& 273). He also ~started to extend the eaves on the
building and had them about one-half done when
the building burned (R. 246). There were some holes
in the floor, other than the cuts and within a few feet
of them. He claimed to have done a lot of work on
the building including installation of some new
doors on inside and outside (R. 117-119).
7
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However, Mr. Welchman, a tenant of Mr.
Pages's who lived immediately next to the burned
building and resided there at the time of trial
(R. 174) who was the only one who did any carpentry work on the building (R. 159 & 249) and the
only person who had a key to the building other
than Mr. Page (R. 177 & 253), testified that he
did the work on the roof (R. 244); that he patched
the rseams on the roof where the cuts were made
by nailing tin strips over the roof cuts to keep the
rain out (R. 249); that some of the walls were
badly damaged (R. 248) ; that they were just repaired enough to plug up holes so one could store
things in them and keep the kids out (R. 246) and
that no permanent repairs had been made on them
at all (R. 246 & 249). The floors had not been
repaired rso that they hold together where they
had been cut; that three-fourths of the window
panes were out (R. 247 & 265) which he and Mr.
Page installed (R. 249) and that about one-half
of the extension on the eave had been co1npleted at
the time of the fire. No roofing had been put on
the eaves that had been completed (R. 246). The
doors on the building could not be locked and kids
ran through the building, but the doors and locks
were eventually repaired ( R. 246) ; possibly two
were replaced (R. 247). No plumbing work was
done on the building (R 252). Some of the cupboards in the apartments were in very bad shape
(R. 252). The floors had coverings on them. How8
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ever, in some places it was torn up and in pretty
bad shape (R. 253). No work had been done on the
rafters of the building (R. 252). Mr. Page and Mr.
Welchman had a falling out and Mr. Welchman quit
working for Mr. Page. However, later Mr. Page
gave Mr. Welchman his key back and Mr. Welchman·
did a little more work for Mr. Page. He continued,
to live in the building next to the burned fourplex.
and was around there all the time as he was unemployed. He stated he didn't know of any additional work being done during thi'S period (R. 272).
In accordance with Mr. Page's statement at the·
time he took the first policy, he applied for an additional $10,000 which was written on June 27, 1960.
He stated that he called the order in on the phone,
told the person he talked to that he spent a considerable amount of money and work and at the
time he took out the original policy he was going
to add to the insurance on the building. He stated
that they then okayed the policy (R. 110 & 137).'
The company did not send anyone out to see the
property but relied on Mr. Page''S examination and
representation as to the condition of the building
(R. 137 & 151). Mr. Page was the only one who
made any appraisal or inspection of the building
( R. 137). He again signed the policy as agent ( R. 5)
(Exh. P. 2).
A fire occurred involving a small outbuilding
about 40 feet from tho fourplex. The small building
had been constructed before the Air Force building
9
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was ever moved to the site where it later burned
(R. 264). Mr. Page had a policy of insurance on the
building next to the fourplex which burned (See
Exh. 7, 8 & 11P) but he as agent told the agent from
General Adustment Bureau, an independent adjusting agency, who came out to adjust the loss, which
policy to charge the loss of the small building to.
Mr. Page said it wa'S closer to the fourplex that
later burned so he attacned the loss to the policy
on it (R. 152 & 156).
After the pre-trial on March 6, 1962, d~fendant
filed a motion for leave to amend the pre-trial order
to include a defense of fraud and misrepresentation,
pursuant to admissions in Mr. Page's deposition.
'The pre-trial Judge after discussion between counsel
and the court ruled that part of the claimed fraud,
if it existed, was against the state and would not
be admissible in this case but that the question of
whether Mr. Page violated his fiduciary C:uty to
the company would be an issue in the case and as
noted in the amended pre-trial order, dated March
30, 1962, counsel agreed that the issue could be presented at the trial (R. 17, 18 & 19).
Each party had three expert witnesses testify
concerning the actual cash value of the building:
Ronald Sylvester for the plaintiff, $38,430.00 (R.
188 & 193) John W. New, for the plaintiff, $33,718.39
(R202 & 222); Sam F. Soter, for the plaintiff, $27,804.24 (R ..222 & 230). The plaintiff''S witnesses were
all contractors and none of them were qualified ap10
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praislll's. The defendant's expert witnesses were
Alex Gray, $2--1,780.16 (R. 274 & 283 & 297-298);
Raymond S. Fletcher, $7,500 (R. 308 & 334); and
Guy D. Adler, $7,500 (R. 335 & 343). Mr. Gray's
bid did not take into consideration depreciation but
was only the cost of rebuilding the structure with
new materials (R. 277 & 298), and wa'S not claimed
to be the actual cash value of the building at the
time of the fire. The witnesses Fletcher and Alder
were qualified appraisers both b2ing 1nembers of
the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers
and both with .many years of experience in the field
of appraising (R. 309-310) (Exh. 2D). Mr. Alder
was also president of the Utah Society of Residential
Appraisers, S.R.A. (R. 335). Each of them made
a thorough study of the structure of the building
and took into consideration the various elements of
depreciation and obsolescence in arriving at the
actual cash value of the building.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, OR THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER OR NOT MR. PAGE VIOLATED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY WAS A PROPER ISSUE BEFORE THE
TRIAL 'COURT AND JURY AND A PROPE'R MATTER
OF DEFENSE.

It is discretionary with the pre-trial judge as
to whether additional issues not pleaded in the original pleadings may be added at time of the pre-trial
hearing. In this case the plaintiff not only was put
on notice in plenty of time, 26 days, before the actual
11
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trial, but as stated in the amended pre-trial order:
"Counsel have agreed that the following
issue may be presented at the trial***"
"It is stipulated that the plaintiff Page
was the agent of the insurance company at
the time of the placement of this policy and
worked through the general agent Heber J.
Grant and Company. Defendant contends
that in so dealing he owed a fiduciary relationship (duty) to the insurance company and
thus being interested in the result of the
transaction he violated his duty towards
them.''
The record is clear that the pre-trial judge listed
as one of the issues the question whether l\ir. Page
violated his fiduciary duty in the placeinent of the
policies. This was, therefore, a proper issue before
the tria!l court.
Defendant claimed in its motion that Page purchased the building and placed it on an area of
land which he knew was going to be taken by the
State Road Commission for a highway and that he
purchased the policies of insurance in large amounts
to try to substantiate the values which he proposed
to collect from the State. Mr. Page's deposition
contained admissions pertaining to this but the pretrial judge ruled that this proposed fraud, if any,
would not constitute a defense to the defendant on
the policies issued to Page.
The fiduciary duty of Mr. Page a:s an agent
was discussed and Judge Van Cott, the pre-trial
12
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judge, said he would make the question of the violation of the fiduciary duty an issue in the case, which
was done.
It has been common practice in pre-trial procedure in Salt Lake County to set up additional
issues not set up in the pleadings when the facts
warranted it. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes the court to do so and a proper
order was made in this case.
Plaintiff was not surprised or should not have
been concern'ing this defense in this case because
although he objected to the original pre-trial order
being amended he did consent to the issue being
presented at trial (R. 19). The trial judge readily
recognized that this issue had been raised by the
amended pre-trial order (R. 94-95). Counsel fori
defendant prepared an instruction on the issue·
which was presented to the court prior to the commencement of the trial (R. 30) and plaintiff's counsel also recognized that it was an issue because he
stated to Judge Faux:
"The plaintiff objects again as it did in
the amended pre-trial order of the inclusion
of the question as to whether or not the fiduciary capacty of the insured and the agent
creates a defense on the policy itself." (R. 94).
Defendant never did waive this defense. The defendant contended that the agent made his own
appraisal or in other words inspection or surveillance of the building and the policies were issued
on his representation as agent. Valuation with re13
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spect to the amount to be paid under the policy is
governed by the terms of the policy and is based on
actual cash value.
Section 13 of the Restatement of the Law of
Agency states as follows with respect to an agent's
fiduciary duty:
"An agent is a fiduciary with respect to
matters within the scope of his agency."
Comment A.
"The agreement to act on behalf of the
principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary;
that is, a person having a duty created by his
undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit
of another in matters connected with his undertaking. Among the agent's fiduciary duties
to the principal is the duty to * * * * deal
fairly with the principal in all transactions
with him."
Seeton 390 of the Restatement of the Law of
Agency states as follows in connection with the
agent acting as an adverse party with the principal's
consent:
"An agent in dealing with the principal
on his own account in regard to subject matter
as to which he is employed is subject to a
duty to deal fairly with the principal and to
communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction of which he has
ndtice, unless the principal has manifested
that he knows such facts or that he does not
care to know them."
Comment A. Facts to be disclosed.
"One employed as agent violates no duty
14
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to the principal by acting for his own benefit
if he makes a full disclosure of the facts to an
acquiescent principal and takes no unfair advantage of him. Before dealing with the
principal on his own account, however, an
agent has a duty, not only to make no misstatements of fact but also to disclose to the principal all material facts fully and completely.
A fact is material within the meaning of the
rule stated in this section if it is one the
agent should realize would be likely to affect
the judgment of the principal in giving his
consent to the agent to enter into the particular transaction on the specified terms.
Hence, the disclosure must include not only
the fact that the agent is acting on his own
account, but also all other facts which he
should realize have or are likely to have a
bearing upon the desirability of the transaction from the viewpoint of the principal."
Comment B. Facts which agent should know.
"The duty is positive so that although
the agent is inadvertent and non negligent
in failing to reveal material facts in his possession the transaction is voidable by a principal ignorant of them."
Section 387 of the Restatement of Agency covering duties of loyalty states as follows:
"An agent is subect to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with the
agency."
Comment B. Scope of duty.
"The agent's duty is not only to act solely
15
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for the benefit of the principal in matte~s
entrusted to him but also to take no unfair
advantage of his position in the. use o~ ~hings
acquired by him because of his position as
agent or because of the opportunities which
his position affords."
Comment F, under Section 390, states as follows:
"The burden of proof is on the agent to
show that the principal was informed of all
material facts and that the transaction was
fair."
In the case of Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan & Trust
Company, Utah 1935, 87 U t. 364 49 P (2) 403, the
Utah court in analyzing the case stated:
"it is true that upon the establishment of
certain fiduciary relationships and transactions between the parties to that relationship
equity will presume fraud, the abuse of confidence, and will place the burden of proving
good faith and fairness upon the don1inant
party in the relationship. In such cases, the
presumption of fraud may be based upon the
relationship alone, and relieves the party from
proving the fraud, but the fraud is, nevertheless, an essential element. By the presumption equity supplies that element. The relationship wherein such presumptions have been
indulged are * * * principal and agent. In other cases the presumption of fraud has been
given effect when there has been a relationship
of confidence plus other circumstances tending
to show that son1e advantage has been taken
by the dominant party with the consequent
abuse of confidence."
1
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Plaintiff has cited on Page 10 of his brief 20A
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice, 11978,
concerning misrepresentations and the burden of
proof. The rule set forth therein is not applicable
where an agent in fiduciary capacity deals with the
principal on his own account. As set forth in the
Restatement of Agency, Section 390, Comment F,
Supra:
"The burden shifts to the agent to show
that the transaction was fair in all respects
and that he did not take unfair advantage
of his principal."
Utah has followed this principle of law in several
cases: In addition to the Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan
& Trust Company, Case, Supra, see Hawkins vs.
Perry, Utah, 123 Ut. 16 253 P(2) 372, Peterson vs.
Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 216, In Re Swans Estate,
(4 Utah (2) 277) (293 P(2) 682).
The authorities which plaintiff has cited with
respect to imputing the knowledge of the agent to
the insurer are not applicable where the insured is
the agent himself. If the rules quoted by plaintiff
were applicable to this situation, then one could
not rely upon or trust ones own agent. Mr. Page
had been an agent for over 30 years. The general
agent had a right to rely on him to disclose fully
all rna terial facts pertaining to the transaction at
all times.
Page's duty in acting as an agent in selling this
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policy on his own property was to get for the insurance company the terms most favorable for the
company considering the risk involved. For himself,
he was interested in getting the best rate he could
for himself. There was a definite conflict of interests. Under the circumstances it was his duty to
fully disclose every material fact which would affect
the company's judgment with respect to whether
or not they would write the risk at all and if so, the
rate that would be charged. Mr. Page secured an
agent's commission for selling those policies to himself.
In the case of Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-·
pany vs. McGreavy, 118 Fed. (2) 115, an insurance
agent issued a policy to himself on a warehouse).
purchased by him a few days before for $500. He·
reported the insurance to the company with the
statement that the building was worth from $3,500
to $4,000 but did not disclose his recent pl.1rchase.
nor the fact that the building had been erected as:
a creamery and had been put to various uses, none
of which proved profitable. The con1pany's instructions to its agents were to consider risks with reference 'to their moral hazard and not to /issue a
policy for an amount the insured would rather have
than the risk covered, and if a building was badly
located, too large or in a business not adapted to it,
not to write it. In that case they held in an :action on
the policy after the loss that the materiality of the
agent's concealment was so obvious as to be decided
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as a matter of law and it was error to submit it
to a jury. In our ca:se the jury found that Page
knowingly failed to make a full and honest dis;
closure of the material facts. His concealment makes
the policy voidable.
Plaintiff contends that even though he may
have been guilty of fraud or violated his fiduciary
duty as an agent, the general agent, even though
it wasn't advised by Page of all the facts, waived
the fraud or violation of duty on behalf of Utah
Home Fire Insurance Company and in addition wa:s
put on notice of all facts which Page as soliciting
agent failed to reveal to the general agent. The
soliciting agent and the general agent were both
under a duty to reveal facts to Utah Home Fire
Insurance Company and Utah Home Fire Insurance
Company had a right to rely on both agents.
Section 9104 of Volume 16, Appleman Insurance
Lavv and Practice, pertaining to local, soliciting and
sub-agents states as follows:
"Ordinarily, notice to or knowledge of a
solicting agent of an insurance company received while acting within the scope of his
authority and performance of his duties, is
chargeable to the insurer. Acts and knowledge of a local agent concerning property insured against fire at the time the policy was
executed is imputable to the insurer. And the
rule of imputed knowledge is applied with
particular force as to such information a
soliciting agent receives while engaged in
solici'ting insurance or preparing the applica19
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tion, prior to the execution of the policy. The
insurer is not only bound by hi'S knowledge at
such times, but also by his acts and representations in connection therewith.
It is the duty of an agent authorized by
an insurance company to solicit and transmit
applications for insurance, to prepare such
applications, so as accurately to state theresult of the negotiations, and his failure so to
do is in legal effect the fault of the company.
The knowledge of an agent soliciting and collecting premiums of facts justifying the insurer in forfeiting a policy is binding upon
i't, though not communicated. So, when a soli~
citing agent has knowledge of facts, received
by him prior to the execution of the policy,
which would render the policy void ab initio
or justify the insurer in declaring a forfeiture
thereof, a company thereafter issuing the
policy cannot avoid liability at some subse~
quent date upon such ground."
Mr. Page was a soliciting agent without any ques~
tion, and he signed the policies which were issued
to him as agent. The rule just quoted by counsel is
similar to the rule pertaining 'to a general agent. On
the basis of Mr. Dahl's argument, the knowledge of
Page would, therefore, be imputed to the insurance
company, but certainly this could not be so because
this would protect the agent in perpetrating and
accomplishing a fraud upon the insurance company.
The rule is that the agent n1ust disclose every material fact to the company in order to clear himself
of any imputation of fraud. While there may not
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have been any actual fraud upon the part of
Heber J. Grant and Company, certainly there appears to be some collusion here if the facts as stated
by the witnesses were true. This collusion would
not relieve Mr. Page from the fraud upon his part
of the violation of his fiduciary duty. In Volume 16,
Appleman on Insurance, Section 9104 beginning on
Page 646, it is stated:
"The rule of imputed knowledge is generally followed, in the absence of fraud or collusion between the agent and those taking insurance." (Boldface ours.)
Under the circumstances of the Page case it is submitted that neither Mr. Page's knowledge nor the
knowledge of the Heber J. Grant and Company
would be imputed to Utah Home Fire Insurance
Company in view of the violation of the fiduciary
duty upon the part of Mr. Page and upon the part
perhaps of the I-IeLer J. Grant and Con1pany.
In the case of Harland vs. Liverpool and L. & G.
Insurance Company, 192 Mo. App. 198, 180 S.W.
998, an agent's failure to make a full disclosure of
all the facts rendered the policy voidable at the
option of the insurer. The agent bought a stock
of certain goods at an administrator's sale for $425
or $450; he was one of the appraisers who had appraised the stock for the administrator, and this
appraisement fixed the value thereof at $555.35;
after purchasing the stock and adding thereto other
goods of a comparatively small amount in value, he
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issued a policy to himself for $900 on the stock,
admittedly worth that much and more; he sent a
copy of the policy to the insurer, and it with knowledge that he was the insured, assented to his having
insured himself; and while he had shown the stock
to the insurer's general agent, at whose suggestion
he issued the policy, and had told the latter the
stock invoiced at $700 or $800, but that he bought
it at administration sale for less, he did not disclose
that he had appraised the property, nor the amount
of such appraisement, nor the price he paid. It was
held that neither the partial disclosure of these facts
made by the agent to the insurer's general agent,
nor the fact that the property may have been in
reality worth more than $900, the amount for which
it was insured, absolved him from his duty as an
agent to make a full disclosure of what he did pay
and all the facts concerning the stock.
Plaintiff claims on page 14 of his brief that the
only testimony opposing Mr. Page's testimony as to
the condition of the building as recited in R. 108-110
is the testimony of Mr. Inkley and that Mr. Inkley's
memory was bad. Mr. Page's testimony as set forth
on pages 108-110 of the record was changed greatly
on cross examination (R. 135-183). Mr. W·elchman's
testimony was also greatly in conflict with Mr.
Page's testimony as to the condition of the building
(R. 244-253). Defendant's counsel would al'so point
out to the court that a demand was made at the time
of the taking of his deposition for the invoices and
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checks covering Mr. Page's expenditures on the
building (R. 163) which he claimed was in the neighborhood of $6,000 (R. 165). He acknowledged he
received invoices for his purchases at the time of
the purchase but stated that he threw the invoices
away at the end of each year and kept his cancelled
checks (R. 161, 162). However, he was unable to
identify the particular checks with any particular
purchase and on cross examination admitted the following discrepancies: Claimed that he paid LaVeil
Webster $1,800 for the building including the moving
thereof, when in fact the checks totalled $1,600 {R.
136) ; claimed he paid Welchman $1,000 (R. 166) ;
his checks, however, totaled $153 (R. 167), but he
claimed then that he had allo·wed him credit on rent
for a few hundred dollars, not to exceed $500; he
furnished two checks for having gas run in the
vicinity of the premises totaling $163.50 but on cross
exa1nination achnitted that only $100 was for thi'S
building and that the balance was for the fourplex
in the vicinity of the one that burned, and also that
a refund was made to him from the amount paid
(R. 169); a check was also furnished payable to an
E. Moreau for $40 which Page also admitted was
not for the building (R. 169); there was another
check for sand and gravel which was issued almost
a year after the building was burned which Page
also admitted could not be traced to the building
(R. 169). Plaintiff's counsel admitted that the checks
might not be the ones for the particular building as
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did Mr. Page (R. 162, 163}. There were many other
points where Mr. Page's testimony conflicted with
the testimony of other witnesses and his own previous testi'mony, and i t was not surprising that the
jury found that he failed to make an honest disclosure of material facts to the defendant company.
1

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM·1\1:IT ERROR
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO TH·E JURY.

The court's instruction 11 (a) was not erroneous
but properly instructed the jury of the element'S to
take into consideration in determining actual cash
value. As stated by appellants counsel, the definition
of actual cash value as it applies to fire insurance
policies on buildings has not been decided by the
Utah Supreme Court.
The instruction as given is as follows:
"In determining the actual cash value
of the burned fourplex you may consider the
following factors based upon the evidence
which has been presented and accepted during
the course of the trial: The size of the building, the kind and quality of material of which
it was constructed, the replace1nent cost with
proper allowance for depreciation and deteriora!ti'on from use, age and other like causes,
the manner of wear and tear to which the
building had been subjected, its state of repair
at the time of the loss, the obsolescence, both
structural and functional, the neighborhood
in which the building was located, the rental
value and all other relevant facts and circum24
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stances in evidence which affected the value
of the property." (R. 45)
Plaintiff's experts all testified as to the value
by taking the cost of const111cting the building new,
on the basis of materials of which Mr. Page said it
was constructed, less depreciation on the basis of a
chart. On cross examination Mr. Page had to admit
that many of the materials he claimed were used in
the building were in error. None of the plaintiff's
witnesses took into consideration the actual condition of the building at the time of the fire as developed by the various witnesses, but determined the
value based on a building in good condition. They
likewise did not take into consideration the location
of the building just south of the prison immediately
adjacent to an automobile salvage yard and many
other factors. In order to arrive at the actual cash
value it would be necessary to properly consider
these various elements and the court properly advised the jury that they could take into consideration
these factors.
IThe appraisers Fletcher and Alder cal1ed by the
defendant to testify concerning the actual cash value
each testified that they approached the problem
using three different methods of valuation, to-wit:
Cost approach, market approach and income approach, and that from these three they correlated
the values and arrived at a final figure. (R. 310, 311,
337, 338). The value of the building was not based
on market value a:s claimed by counsel for plaintiff
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but on actual cash value as determined by their
appraisals using the three methods of approach. The
factors set forth in the instruction were all covered
by various witnesses and properly admitted as evidence. The instruction was, therefore, proper.
"In recent years there has been a tendency on the part of a substantial number of
courts to reject reproduction or replacement
cost or market value as the 'Sole test or criteria
of the actual cash value of the buildings. These
courts have relied upon what might be termed
the 'broad evidence rule' under which the
courts will receive any evidence logically tending to show actual cash value." (61 ALR (2)
729, sub paragraph C.)
There follo·ws after said paragraph a number of
jurisdictions following this rule. On page 728 of 61
ALR (2) it is stated:
"Many courts although rejecting reproduction or replacement cost less depreciation
as the sole test of the actual cash value of an
insured building, have recognized that it constitutes evidence of such value."
The states following the Idaho decision of Boise Association of Credit Men vs. U. S. Fire Insurance
Company, 256 Pac. 523, appear to be in the great
minority and this Idaho case is an old case. The
rule 'Sought to be invoked by plaintiff would be manifestly unfair if used under circumstances involving
a building in a state of disrepair and poor loca:tion
as the building of the plaintiffs herein.
The jury did not accept as the actual cash value
2.G
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what any one 'vitness testified to but arrived at
their own figure in between plaintiff''S and defendant's figures. Defendant submits that there was no
error ·with respect to the court's instruction on
actual cash value.
It is discretionary with the court as to whether
to submit the case on special interrogatories or on
a general verdict. Rule 49 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may require a jury
to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue of fact and
further that if the court omits any issue of fact
raised by pleadings or the evidence each party
waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so
omitted unless before the jury retires he demand~
its submission to the jury or as to an issuse omitted
without such den1and the court 1nay make a finding,
or if it fails to do so it shall be deemed to have made
a finding in accord with the judgment on the 'Special
verdict.
The plaintiff was not deprived of a jury trial by
reason of the court's sub1nission of the case to the
jury on special interrogatories.
The second special interrogatory required the
jury to make a special finding as to whether or not
Page knowingly failed to make a full and honest
disclosure to the defendant fire insurance company
of the material facts regardig the nature and intended use of the burned fourplex.
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff now complains that the court did not
distinguish in this interrogatory between the nature
or condition of the building at the time of the issuance of the first policy and the condition at the time
of the second policy. It was not until after the trial
was completed that plaintiff attempted Ito distinguish between policies at all.
As far as Meredith Page was concerned he took
out the original policy and a'S he explained originally
when he took out the first policy he would do some
work on the building and then take some more insurance. (R. 110). At the time he took the $10,000
policy he told whoever he ta1ked to on the phone that
he spent a considerable amount of money and work
and at the time he took out the original policy he
was going to add to the insurance on the building.
This policy was not to replace the original policy.
In fact, Mr. Page himself said that the policy was
issued on the basis of what he had represented to
them (R. 157). His testimony was as follows:

"Q. Now at the time you requested the
second policy all you did was telephone it in,
was it not, and ask them to put an additional
$10,000 on the building.
A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall who you talked to on
that occasion?
A. No, I don't. It was never anyone who
-Ove Inckley, or it could be Mr. Taylor, it
could be Mr. Everett or anyone in the office.
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Q. Now that policy then wa:s put on by
you as an agent, you were the only one who
made any inspection of the building down to
that time?
A. Yes, I explained over the phone that
I did spend a considerable amount of money
and work and at the time I took out the original policy that I was going to add to the insurance on this building, when I did some
work and they said that was okay.
Q. That would be on the basis 'still of
what you had represented to them?
A. That's right." (R. 156, 157)
There was no reason for the court to distinguish
between the policies especially in view of the fact
that counsel for the plaintiff had made no attempt
to distinguish between them. However, Mr. Page
still owed a fiduciary duty to the insurance company
at that time and by his own statement as to what he
told the person to \\' ho1n he talked he did not disclose
the condition of the building. According to the evidence the building at that time had only about half
of the eaves constructed, no roofing paper had been
put on the extended eaves, some of the walls \vere
still badly damaged, no permanent repairs had been
made, tin had been placed over roof cuts, the floor
cuts had not been repaired, the wiring had not been
repaired no plumbing work had been done, some of
the cupboards \vere in bad shape, no work had been
done on the rafters in the building, and the coverings
on the floors were torn up and in pretty bad shape
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in some places (R. 244-253). Mr. Page himself admitted many of these things but he still failed to
reveal this information to the company or its general
agent.
The instructions submitted to the jury had to
be based on the relationship that existed between
Mr. Page and the defendant ·company and the instruction properly presented to the jury the question
of whether or not 'Mr. Page made a full and honest
disclosure to the defendant company of the material
facts which it was his duty to do. However, plaintiff
is asking that this relationship te disregarded and
that rules of law appl'icable to the usua1 policyholder,
not an agent of the company, be applied. The trial
court did not mention fraud in its instruction although the acts of the agent did in fact constitute
a fraud on the company and make the policy voidable
under the terms of the policy itself which provided
that:
"This entire policy shall be void if,
whether before or after a loss, the insured
has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circum'Stance concerning this
insurance or the subJect thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case of any
fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto." (Exibits 1 P, 2P).
The defendant was ·entitled to a directed verdict
as a matter of law on the basis of the evidence and
the plantiff was certainly not prejudiced by the instructions given to the jury which though perhaps
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not as con1plete as may be desirable, nevertheless
fairly presented the issues to the jury.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS JUDGMENT IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.

The trial court did not invade the province of
the jury by making its own findings of fact with
respect to violation of plaintiff's fiduciary duty as
to the issuance of the second policy. Neither counsel
asked for an instruction with respect to the second
policy. As previously stated, rule 49 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if counsel
fails to request an instruction on an issue raised
by the pleadings or the evidence the court may make
its own findings. On the basis of this rule the court
properly made a finding that Meredith Page failed
to disclose the condition of the building to the defendant company at the time of the issuance of the
second policy ·and that the policy was, therefore, voided as was the first policy. (R. 49, 50).
Subsequently the court announced it would
grant a new trial but the order was never entered
and on motion to reconsider the court entered an
order granting a partial new trial on the issue of the
second policy only.
The defendant contends that there was clear
evidence that the plaintiff violated his fiduciary
duty with respect to both policies and that the
court's judgment of no cause of action was proper
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and should stand, but that if plaintiff i'S ·entitled to
have any part of the case reconsidered that the
question of the actual cash value of the building has
been fairly determined by the jury, and that this
issue should no long·er be in doubt. A good portion
of the trial time, and much of the trial expense was
incurred in connection with the 'Six expert witnesses
called to testify as to this phase of the case.
Our Rule 59 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues." *****
(Boldface ours.)
In Moore's Federal Practice, Second Edition,
Volume 6, Page 3761, under Rule 59.06, Partial New
Trials, it is stated as follows pertaining to the rule
invol'Ved:
"On a motion for new trial, therefore, the
trial court has discretion in both jury and
non-jury cases to order that the new trial be
had on all or part of the is'Sues and as to all or
any of the parties. As we shall see, this may
only be done, however, if the issues as to
'vhich the new trial is ordered are so distinct
and independent from the re'St of the case that
they may be s·eparately tried without injustice. If the determination as to a certain
issue or as to less than all of the parties is
not fairly severable from the rest of the case,
but i~s interwoven with the remaining issues,
the court may not order a partial re-trial. A
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constructive analysis of the use of the partial
new trial in jury cases appears in Yates vs.
Dann. In this case a seaman sued his employer for personal injuries sustained in the
course of employment. The case was submitted to the jury with instructions to answer
certain interrogatories. The jury rendered
a verdict for the plaintiff in a sum representing past earnings, but no award was made for
pain and suffering and future impairment of
earning capacity. The plaintiff's motion for
new trial limited to the issue of damage was
gran ted. Chief Judge Leahy, in an excellent
opinion, stated: 'Under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 59, the trial judge has discretion to order a partial new trial as to one
or more issues where it appears the issue in
question is severable from and not interwoven
with the remaining issues.' The theory behind
this rule is a party who has already had his
day in court as to a particular issue may not
have another opportunity to relitigate the
same point unless a partial new trial will
result in a miscarriage of injustice. I think
FR 59 was intended to prevent the re-trial
of any issue already properly decided, and to
limit any new trial only to those issues which
are incorrectly decided or not decided at all.
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, courts have indicated a trend
to limiting re-trials to specifc issues whenever
possible, particularly in personal injury cases
where the issue of damages is independent
from that relating to liability.
Defendant here has had a fair trial on the
issue of liability, and it would be, I think,
obviously grossly unfair to plaintiff as well as
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contrary to the spirit of FR 59, to require a
re-trial of the question of defendant's culpability which has already been decided by the
jury in plaintiff's favor. Moreover, as Judge
Kirkpatrick pointed out in the Tompkin's
ca:se, a gra:ve injustice would appear to a plaintiff if, having supmitted the question of
liability to a jury, and having obtained a favorable verdict, plaintiff should be compelled
to risk another trial, with a possibility of an
adverse verdict, solely because the jury failed
to make into consideration all of the elements
of damage as clearly instructed by the court.'
As was done in Yates, supra, the partial
new trial device is often used to limit the new
trial to the issue of damages where liability
has been competently determined by the jury,
and the damage issue is not interwoven with
the liability issue. On the other hand, if the
amount of the damages may not be determined wi1thout a redetern1'ination of the liability issue a new trial as to all of the issues
must be ordered.
Where the issue of damages is determined
satisfactorily to the trial court, the court may
order a new trial limited to the issue of liability. In Calaf 'vs. Fernandez, the suit was for
breach of contract for the sale of land, and
the jury awarded plaintiff approximately
$21,000 in damages. The trial court ordered
a new trial limited to the issue of the title to
the property. On appeal, the first circuit affirmed, and stated: 'It is not an unusual
thing to order a new trial upon a particular
branch of a controversy. It often happens,
where a defeated party is aggrieved by the
phase of a trial which had to do with the
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damages, that the verdict is set aside in that
respect and a new trial ordered upon the
question of damages only; and it sometimes
happens, where the grieViance has reference to
the primary right- that of recovery- and
where there is no substantial controversy as
to the question of damages, if the right of
recovery is established, that the verdict is set
aside upon the question of right of recovery
only, and the scope of the trial limited accordingly. The question as to what should be done
in a given case under a motion for new trial,
in whole or in part, is always largely a question of discretion. The practice of not going
over unnecessary grounds which at the end
of the first trial and the verdict are found
not to involve substantial dispute, and trying
again questions that are not in substantial
controversy through the instrumentality of a
new trial, granted in the exercise of discretion, is a salutary one, and the authorities
and the textbooks sufficiently sustain it."

CROSS APPEAL
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRE'D IN GRANTING A PARTIAL
NE\V TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF
THE SECOND POLICY PURCHASED BY THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE DEFENDANT.

The issue raised by the defendant in this cross
appeal has been discussed in respondent's brief under
the points argued therein but in summary the defendant contends that the two policies should be
treated as only one, as the plaintiff did in purchasing
the insurance. The evidence is clear that the building was in very poor condition at the time the second
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policy was secured by Mr. Page; that he failed to
disclose to the defendant, Utah Home Fire Insurance
Company, its general agent, the nature or condition
of the building at that time or its immediate Intended use, and in that regard violated his fiduciary
duty to fully disclose all material facts to the insurance company, and the policy was, therefore, voidable
by the company as a matter of law. It was, therefore, error for the court to grant a new trial on
this issue.
CONCLUSION
The defendant submits that the plaintiff has
had a fair trial upon all the issues of the case and
that a new trial should not be granted on any issues
but that if a new trial is granted on any issues that
it should not be granted on the issue of actual cash
value of the burned fourplex as that has been fully
and fairly decided on the basis of proper instructions.
On the basis of the evidence it is clear as a
matter of law that Page violated his fiduciary duty
and that the defendant company is entitled to a
judgment of no cause of action which should be
the judgment of this court.
Respectfully submitted,
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Defendant,
Salt Lake City, Utah
604 Boston Building
Respondent and Cross Appellant
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